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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
In a tragic case that suggests systemic deficiencies at 
the juncture of Pennsylvania’s criminal justice and mental 
health systems, the Appellant in this case—an adult with 
mental retardation and other mental illness—was charged for 
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a crime that may not have occurred and was then detained for 
nearly a decade awaiting trial, even though it was determined 
early in the proceedings that he was incompetent and unlikely 
to improve.  With fault shared among the Uniontown Police 
Department, the Fayette County Public Defender’s Office and 
later, private counsel, the Fayette County District Attorney’s 
Office, the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, and 
the mental health infrastructure of Pennsylvania, Craig 
Geness’s criminal case was inadequately investigated, 
inadequately defended, and inadequately monitored and 
supervised as Geness languished in various detention 
facilities.  All the while, his petition for habeas relief 
remained pending.  And when a hearing was finally held on 
that petition, the District Attorney’s Office voluntarily 
dismissed the charges out of concern for its “ability to meet 
its burden of proof, even if the defendant were competent.”  
App. 205a. 
 
This appeal arises from Geness’s subsequent lawsuit 
against the arresting officer, then-Detective Jason Cox,1 and 
various other defendants, claiming they violated his civil 
rights through reckless investigation, false arrest, false 
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and that they denied him due process and 
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 
                                              
1 Appellee Jason Cox is now Chief of Police for the 
Uniontown Police Department.  Simply for ease of reference, 
and without intending any disrespect to the parties, we will 
refer to former-Detective Cox and Mr. Geness as simply 
“Cox” and “Geness.”  
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U.S.C § 12131.  But at this point—nearly a dozen years after 
Geness’s arrest and with the performance of his various 
counsel marred by inexcusable delays and dilatory discovery 
efforts—most avenues of relief are now closed to him.  For 
the reasons explained below, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of Geness’s § 1983 claims but will reverse 
its denial of leave for Geness to amend his complaint and will 
remand for him to reinstitute his due process and ADA claims 
against the Commonwealth.   
  
I. Background 
 
 A. The Incident at the McVey Personal Care 
Home 
 
In 2006, Craig Geness lived at the McVey Personal 
Care Home, an assisted living facility for intellectually 
disabled people, in Uniontown, Pennsylvania.  In October of 
that year, another resident, Ronald Fiffik, fell from the front 
porch of the building and sustained serious injuries.  Hearing 
the resulting commotion, James McVey, the son of the owner 
and the supervisor then on duty, walked out to the porch to 
find Fiffik lying on the ground.  He called for an ambulance, 
informing the dispatcher that a resident had fallen, and Fiffik 
was taken by an emergency medical services (“EMS”) unit to 
Uniontown Hospital where he was treated before being 
discharged to the McVey Home later that day.  That evening, 
however, Fiffik’s pain intensified and he returned to the 
hospital where his condition continued to deteriorate, 
ultimately resulting in his death a few weeks later.   
 
Three contemporaneous records from the day of the 
incident indicated that Fiffik had merely fallen in an 
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unfortunate accident.  First, the initial EMS record noted that 
the ambulance was dispatched “in response to a fall” and also 
reflected that Fiffik’s wife had witnessed the incident and that 
she “stated that [Fiffik] walked out on porch and fell down 
approx[.] 5 steps head first.”  App. 193a.  Next, a Uniontown 
police officer who responded to the scene filled out an 
incident report, stating that a “[c]aller . . . reported that a male 
fell off of a porch” and that the officer took “[n]o further 
police action . . . [because] no one onscene [sic] could 
provide[] any information as to what happened other than 
[that] Fiffik fell off of the porch.”  App. 140.  Finally, Fiffik’s 
hospital admission records reflected that Fiffik was “alert, 
cooperative in no distress,” that his “chief complaint” was 
that he “FELL,” that he reported he “fell down approximately 
five stairs[,] . . . [h]as [mental retardation] and is unsteady and 
is not supposed to go near the stairs but he did and then he 
fell down them.  It was witnessed.  No loss of consciousness.  
Patient says he feels fine and he wants to go home.”  
App. 171.   
 
Notwithstanding these reports by Fiffik and his wife, 
once Fiffik’s condition deteriorated to the point that he was 
on life support, his daughter reached out to the Uniontown 
Police Department to report her suspicion that her father 
might have been shoved.  As a result, on November 16, 2006, 
Cox conducted a one-day investigation, which involved 
speaking to Fiffik’s daughter and hospital personnel, 
interviewing James McVey, and then interviewing and 
obtaining a confession from Geness.  Soon thereafter, Cox 
swore out a criminal complaint against Geness for aggravated 
assault, later upgraded to murder.   
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In his November 16th interview, with the prospect of a 
personal injury lawsuit, if not wrongful death suit looming, 
McVey reported for the first time that immediately prior to 
Fiffik’s fall he heard Geness scream “shut up” from nearby 
and then saw Geness walk quickly inside to his bedroom.  
App. 141.  McVey also said he then followed Geness to his 
room and asked if he pushed Fiffik, but Geness did not 
answer and instead “responded by laying in a fetal position on 
the bed.”  Id.  In addition, McVey reported, again for the first 
time, that during the brief interlude between Fiffik’s return to 
the McVey Home and his being readmitted to the hospital, 
Fiffik had told McVey that “someone” pushed him.  App. 
143.   
 
With Geness now a suspect in an alleged crime, Cox 
proceeded to interview him.  At that point, for reasons not 
apparent from the record, Geness had been transferred from 
the McVey Home to the Highlands Hospital where he had 
been admitted in the past and was then living as an in-patient.  
According to Cox’s report, he had Geness brought to a room 
to meet with him, read Geness his Miranda warnings, and 
asked if Geness would speak with him concerning “the day 
that Ronald Fiffick fell from the wall.”  App. 141.  Once 
Geness agreed and signed the Miranda waiver, Cox asked 
him the date, the day of the week, if he had gone to high 
school, and who was President of the United States.  Geness 
correctly answered these questions and then, according to the 
report, provided a confession closely tracking McVey’s 
account of events.  That is, he admitted that on the day Fiffik 
was injured, Fiffik “said something” to him; he then 
“screamed at Fiffik ‘Shut Up’” and “voices inside his head 
told him to push Fiffik over the wall”; and he “shoved Fiffik 
hard . . . went up to his bedroom, and shut the door.”  Id.   
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In his Affidavit of Probable Cause in support of the 
arrest warrant, Cox recounted James McVey’s allegations 
against Geness and Geness’s confession, and on that basis, a 
magisterial district judge issued a warrant for Geness’s arrest.  
From that point forward, according to the affidavit he filed in 
support of his motion for summary judgment in the District 
Court, Cox “no longer maintained an active role in the 
prosecution of Mr. Geness,” “heard very little from the 
prosecution regarding this case for approximately seven 
years,” “did not have any role in the subsequent decision 
making in the prosecution,” and “was never contacted by 
[the] Public Defender . . . or [Geness’s private counsel] for 
information relating to [his] investigation . . . .”  App. 165.  
Also according to that affidavit, Cox did not reference the 
exculpatory evidence in the EMS report and the hospital 
admission records in his Affidavit of Probable Cause because 
he “ha[d] no recollection of ever having seen [them] prior to 
the filing of this lawsuit,” and to obtain them, he would have 
required a search warrant, which he also “ha[d] no 
recollection of ever having obtained.”  App. 164. 
 
Upon his arrest, Geness was taken into custody, where, 
between Fayette County Prison and a locked-down mental 
institution, he would remain for over nine years without any 
further investigation, a hearing on his habeas petition, or a 
trial. 
 
 B. Geness’s Incarceration and Eventual Civil 
Commitment  
 
The administration of justice went awry for Geness 
from the outset.  After he was arraigned in November 2006, 
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Geness did not receive a preliminary hearing in magisterial 
district court for over five months.  The Public Defender filed 
a habeas motion in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette 
County in June 2007, asserting that Geness’s confession was 
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and that Cox 
lacked probable cause to arrest.  Yet that motion was not 
ruled upon as Judge Leskinen, to whom the case was 
assigned, opined that Geness was “not at the present time 
competent to stand trial,” App. 147, and the Defender agreed 
to continue any hearing on the petition “until [d]efendant is 
competent,” App. 148.  Pursuant to Section 402 of the 
Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 7402, Geness was ordered to be transferred to 
Mayview State Hospital, for no more than 60 days, to receive 
a psychiatric evaluation.   
 
That transfer, however, was not carried out, and almost 
two months later, the court issued a second order for a 
psychiatric examination to be performed.  Still no action was 
taken.  Finally, in September 2007, nearly ten months after 
Geness’s arrest and after yet a third order was issued, Geness 
received his first examination.  He was diagnosed by a 
psychiatrist with the Psychiatric Forensic Center at Mayview 
State Hospital with mild mental retardation with an IQ of 51 
and schizoaffective bipolar disorder, and was found 
“incompetent to stand trial” because he was unable “to 
understand the concept of trial,” App. 194, or “to recognize 
the role of personnel in the court system . . . [or the] various 
outcomes from his pending charges,” App. 198.  His 
prognosis for improvement was deemed “poor.”  App. 197.   
 
Notwithstanding that prognosis, however, Judge 
Leskinen merely instructed counsel to request a hearing on 
9 
the habeas petition “at such time as def. is deemed competent 
to proceed,” App. 148, and it appears that neither the Public 
Defender, nor the DA’s Office, nor the court paid particular 
heed to the case again for another three years.  Instead, 
Geness was returned to prison where he remained until 
November 2010. 
 
At that point, for reasons not apparent from the record, 
the Public Defender requested that the court order Geness’s 
involuntary commitment and residential treatment.  In 
response, Judge Leskinen ordered a second psychiatric 
examination, noting that upon “a report containing a 
determination that the def. would not regain competency 
within a reasonable period of time . . .  upon motion of 
counsel, the Court will schedule an additional hearing on that 
issue.”  App. 149.   
 
Still, the cycle of indifference continued.  This second 
examination was inexplicably delayed for nearly a year, and 
in the interim, counsel took no action.2  And even after the 
examination was completed and concluded (as the court had 
anticipated) that Geness remained incompetent and was “not 
likely to respond to any additional treatment interventions,” 
App. 203, Geness’s counsel did not request a hearing on his 
long-pending habeas petition, nor did the prosecutor or the 
court raise the matter.  Instead, in September 2011—five 
years after Geness’s arrest and with his criminal charges still 
                                              
2 Geness was ordered evaluated at Torrance State 
Hospital, but apparently on account of space constraints, the 
assessment eventually took place at Fayette County Prison.   
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pending—Judge Leskinen ordered him transferred to 
involuntary commitment in a long term structured residence 
(“LTSR”) where he would be fitted with an ankle monitor 
and would “remain without contact with the general public.”  
App. 151.  He further ordered that Geness be returned to 
Fayette County Prison “upon completion” of his civil 
commitment or upon “a determination that he is competent to 
stand trial, whichever comes first.”  App. 151.  
 
In March 2012, Geness had a change of counsel but, 
sadly, no change of fortune.  According to the affidavit his 
new counsel, Bernadette Tummons, filed in connection with 
the underlying summary judgment proceeding, she made 
numerous and repeated discovery requests of the District 
Attorney’s Office over a two-year period that were simply 
ignored.  Tummons, however, opted not to seek the court’s 
intervention because she was concerned that “doing so would 
have flaunted [sic] the common practice of Fayette County . . 
. , would not have been successful, and would have assuredly 
soured [her] already tenuous relationship with the Office of 
the District Attorney.”  App. 331.   
 
In June 2014, Tummons received a limited document 
production, including Cox’s affidavit and the Public 
Defender’s omnibus pretrial motion that asserted the 
confession was illegal.  Those documents prompted her to 
think Geness’s Miranda waiver and confession might not 
have been voluntary.  By her account, when she next met with 
Geness, he told her he confessed because “the police told him 
[to say] that he pushed Mr. Fiffik.”  App. 332.  Rather than 
acting on this information, however, Tummons opted to await 
further discovery, if forthcoming, from the DA’s Office.  In 
fact, she waited nearly another year before filing her first of 
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three motions to compel in May 2015.  Contrary to her earlier 
assumption, all were successful.  In September 2015, with the 
additional support in the psychiatric reports for her hypothesis 
that the confession was involuntary, Tummons filed a motion 
to dismiss the indictment and renewed motion for habeas 
relief.   
 
 C. The Hearing on Geness’s Motions 
 
Two months later, nearly nine years to the day after his 
arrest, Geness finally received a hearing in the Court of 
Common Pleas.  Unsurprisingly, the DA’s Office advised the 
court that it did not intend to proceed to trial as it anticipated 
it would be “unable to prove the case,” App. 174, and the 
court agreed, noting that “if there is a reasonable possibility 
that the decedent just fell then it would be impossible for the 
Commonwealth to prove the case beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” App. 177.  But despite those observations and the 
protracted proceedings in this case, Judge Leskinen declined 
to reach the merits of Geness’s motion to dismiss or his 
habeas petition, instead inviting the Commonwealth to 
abandon the charges by submitting a request for nolle 
prosequi (“nol pros”), and advising he would just “sign it” if 
submitted.  App. 177-78.  As the court observed, that 
approach would “moot consideration of [the] Motion for 
Habeas Corpus.”  App. 187.   
 
The DA’s Office readily agreed that it would “rather 
be in a position to present the Nol Pros today,” id., and thus, 
over the repeated objection of Tummons, the court postponed 
ruling on Geness’s motions.  The court also rejected 
Tummons’s entreaty that it at least require the prosecutor to 
put “the reasons for the nol pros . . . on the record,” but it did 
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instruct the prosecutor to include those reasons “in the nol 
pros when he brings it up.”  App. 189.  And when it did—not 
that day as promised, but two weeks later—the DA’s office 
acknowledged its reason was not only that the 
“Commonwealth believes that the defendant is and remains 
incompetent for trial,” but also that there were “substantive 
evidentiary issues in this matter that likely could and would 
impair the Commonwealth’s ability to meet its burden of 
proof, even if the defendant were competent.”  App. 205a.   
 
When it came to entering the nol pros order, however, 
the court declined to mention the prosecution’s inability to 
sustain its evidentiary burden, referencing only Geness’s 
incompetence.  And although not argued or requested by the 
prosecution, the court sua sponte offered its opinion that 
“there was clearly sufficient probable cause to file the 
criminal complaint and to pursue the matter,” App. 191, and 
that the charges, which it dismissed “without prejudice,” 
“may be refiled in the event evidence justifying such refiling 
is developed and discovered,” App. 193. 
 
In mid-December 2015, Geness was finally released.  
  
 D. Proceedings in the District Court 
 
In June 2016, represented by his third and current 
attorney, Geness filed a complaint against Cox, James McVey 
and his parents (the owners of the McVey Home), the County 
of Fayette, and the City of Uniontown.  As relevant to this 
appeal, he asserted claims for malicious prosecution, false 
arrest, false imprisonment, and reckless investigation, in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims for violation of due 
process and the ADA.  
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Ruling on the defendants’ motion under Rule 12(b)(6), 
the District Court dismissed Geness’s malicious prosecution 
claim on the ground that the nol pros order, by its terms, did 
not satisfy the element of “favorable termination” of the 
charges against him.  Sometime thereafter, realizing he had 
erroneously filed his ADA and due process claims against the 
City of Uniontown and the County of Fayette instead of the 
Commonwealth, Geness sought leave to amend.  But the 
District Court denied that request, reasoning that amendment 
would be futile because the ADA claim also would be barred 
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as “a direct challenge to a 
state court’s orders and judgments.”  Geness v. Cox, No. 16-
876, 2017 WL 1058826, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2017).  
 
With Geness having voluntarily dismissed all 
defendants but Cox, the parties proceeded with discovery.  
And once that was completed, the District Court granted 
summary judgment on Geness’s reckless investigation, false 
arrest, and false imprisonment claims, concluding that Geness 
“fail[ed] to adduce evidence sufficient to proceed to trial” on 
any of them, and that the claims were also barred by the 
applicable two-year statute of limitations.3  Geness v. Cox, 
                                              
3 The District Court also granted summary judgment 
on Geness’s state law claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress on both statute of limitations and 
sufficiency of the evidence grounds.  We need not dwell on 
this claim, however, as Geness does not challenge the ruling 
that it is time-barred on appeal, and, regardless, Geness did 
not present evidence that he suffered “some type of resulting 
physical harm due to the defendant’s outrageous conduct,” as 
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No. 16-876, 2017 WL 1653613, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 
2017).  
 
II.  Standard of Review4 
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6), Schmidt v. Skolas, 
770 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2014), accepting the complaint’s 
factual allegations as true and construing them in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, Connelly v. Lane 
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790, 793 (3d Cir. 2016).  We 
also review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 
novo, Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d 
Cir. 2015), and we consider the undisputed facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 
Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Finally, we review a district court’s denial of a motion to 
amend for abuse of discretion, Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 
373 (3d Cir. 2000), but where an amendment is denied on the 
grounds of futility, as it was here, we use the “same standard 
of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6),” Shane v. 
Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).  
 
                                                                                                     
required under Pennsylvania law, that claim would fail in any 
event.  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 231-32 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Swisher v. Pitz, 868 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2005)).   
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.      
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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III.  Discussion 
 
For the reasons we explain below, notwithstanding the 
disturbing history of this case, we are constrained to affirm 
the dismissal of Geness’s § 1983 claims because they were 
either time-barred by the date the complaint was filed or were 
not sufficiently substantiated through discovery.  We 
consider, in turn, Geness’s argument concerning the time-
barred claims, the District Court’s dismissal of his malicious 
prosecution claim, and the Court’s denial of leave to amend 
with regard to his due process and ADA claims.   
 
 A. Time-Barred Claims 
 
In what we construe as an argument that the District 
Court erred in concluding that his § 1983 claims for false 
arrest, false imprisonment, and reckless investigation were 
time-barred,5 Geness urges this Court to “rule that Mrs. 
                                              
5 Although Geness purports to state a claim for 
reckless investigation under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, such a claim, if cognizable, could 
only arise under the Fourth Amendment.  See Manuel v. City 
of Joliett, III, 137 S. Ct. 911, 919 (2017) (“If the complaint is 
that a form of legal process resulted in pretrial detention 
unsupported by probable cause, then the right allegedly 
infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.”); accord Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (plurality opinion).  
Whatever doubts we may harbor as to the viability of such a 
claim, however, see Brooks v. City of Chi., 564 F.3d 830, 833 
(7th Cir. 2009) (observing that “[a] plaintiff cannot state a due 
process claim by combining what are essentially claims for 
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Tummons acted in as timely a fashion as possible given all of 
the circumstances and that . . . the constitutional 
claims . . . have been preserved.”  Appellant’s Br. 57.  The 
District Court found that, even with tolling until March 2012 
when Tummons had sufficient information to file a claim, 
Geness’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and reckless 
investigation claims were still filed outside the two-year 
limitations period.  
 
It is the “standard rule” that accrual of a claim 
“commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present 
cause of action,” Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension 
Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997) 
(citation omitted), which occurs for false arrest and false 
imprisonment claims when a plaintiff “appear[s] before the 
examining magistrate and [is] bound over for trial,” i.e., 
                                                                                                     
false arrest under the Fourth Amendment and state law 
malicious prosecution into a sort of hybrid substantive due 
process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment” (citations 
omitted)); Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 
2001) (stating that an officer need not “explore and eliminate 
every theoretically plausible claim of innocence” even if “an 
investigation might have cast doubt upon the basis for the 
arrest” (citations omitted)), we have no occasion to resolve 
them today.  First, no such constitutional right was “clearly 
established” at the relevant time, as required to overcome 
qualified immunity.  Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 
(2011).  Second, such a claim, in any event, would be time 
barred and, for the reasons we discuss below, would not 
survive summary judgment.  See infra Section IV.B.2.  
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“once the victim becomes held pursuant to [legal] process,” 
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389, 391 (2007) (emphasis 
omitted).6  As Geness was held over on the homicide charges 
in 2007, his § 1983 claims expired sometime in 2009, 
rendering the filing of his complaint in 2016 far out of time. 
  
Unfortunately for Geness, although we may toll the 
statute of limitations pursuant to a state law discovery rule or 
applicable federal tolling principle, see Kach v. Hose, 589 
F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 2009), we do not have a basis to do so 
here.  Application of a tolling doctrine requires the plaintiff to 
at least “invoke [the] rule in [the] opening brief.”  Id. at 642.  
In his opening brief, however, Geness’s counsel fails to even 
mention the “discovery rule,” let alone cite to any authority or 
record support for equitable tolling.  Aside from the fact that 
                                              
6 In its recent opinion in Manuel, the Supreme Court 
left unresolved whether a claim for unlawful pretrial 
detention, i.e., imprisonment that persists without probable 
cause beyond the onset of legal process, accrues at the onset 
of that legal process, like a claim of false arrest, see Manuel, 
137 S. Ct. at 921 (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389-90), or 
accrues only upon dismissal of the charges, like a claim of 
malicious prosecution, id.  In Manuel, the Court remanded to 
the Seventh Circuit to address the issue in the first instance; 
here, we have no need to address the issue, given both 
Geness’s failure to raise the issue of accrual, In re Wettach, 
811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that arguments not 
raised in an appellant’s opening brief are forfeited), and our 
conclusion that Geness, in any event, failed to raise a genuine 
dispute of material fact as to probable cause, see infra Section 
IV.B.2. 
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such failure to “cit[e] to the authorities and parts of the record 
on which the appellant relies” violates Fed. R. App. P. 
28(a)(8)(A), it is “well settled that ‘a passing reference to an 
issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.’”  
Kach, 589 F.3d at 642 (quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. 
Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d 
Cir. 1994)); see also In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 
2016) (treating as forfeited arguments not raised in an 
appellant’s opening brief).   
 
In short, Geness has waived any tolling arguments on 
appeal, and the District Court correctly dismissed Geness’s 
false arrest, false imprisonment, and reckless investigation 
claims as time-barred. 
 
 B. Dismissal of the Malicious Prosecution Claim 
 
We next consider the District Court’s dismissal of 
Geness’s malicious prosecution claim, which required him to 
show that: “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; 
(2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the 
defendants initiated the proceeding without probable cause; 
(4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other 
than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) he suffered 
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as 
a consequence of a legal proceeding.”  Zimmerman v. 
Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 
17-1234, 2018 WL 1173874 (U.S. June 11, 2018) (brackets 
and citations omitted); see also Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 
137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
governs a claim for unlawful pretrial detention even beyond 
the start of legal process . . . .”).  Although we conclude the 
District Court erred in dismissing this claim for failure to 
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establish “favorable termination,” we will nonetheless affirm 
because Geness failed at summary judgment to raise a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to the absence of probable 
cause.7   
 
  1. Favorable Termination 
 
 The element of favorable termination is established by 
showing that the proceeding ended in any manner “that 
indicates the innocence of the accused,” Kossler v. Crisanti, 
564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009), which can be satisfied 
when charges are formally abandoned by way of a nol pros, 
Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002).  Here, 
the District Court concluded that the charges did not 
“favorably terminate” for Geness because the nol pros order 
did not itself indicate his innocence.  Geness v. County of 
                                              
7 Having dismissed the malicious prosecution claim at 
the outset, the District Court did not have occasion to address 
the presence of probable cause for that claim in particular at 
summary judgment.  As that element is the same, though, for 
Geness’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims, the 
District Court’s conclusion that he failed to establish a triable 
issue concerning probable cause for those claims would make 
any remand for that determination on the malicious 
prosecution claim futile.  See, e.g., Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 n.9 
(3d Cir. 2010) (declining to remand because the § 1983 claim 
would have been futile).  
  
20 
Fayette, No. 16-876, 2016 WL 6652758, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. 
Nov. 9, 2016).  That reasoning does not square with our 
precedent.  
 
Regardless of whether a nol pros order on its face 
“indicate[s] the innocence of the accused,” Donahue, 280 
F.3d at 383, a district court must conduct a “fact-based 
inquiry,” Kossler, 564 F.3d at 194, considering, among other 
things, the “underlying facts” of the case, id., the “particular 
circumstances” prompting the nol pros determination, id. at 
189, and the substance of the “request for a nol pros that . .  . 
result[ed in the] dismissal,” Donahue, 280 F.3d at 384.  Yet 
the District Court here refused to look beyond the four 
corners of the order.  And it need not have looked far to 
conclude that the nol pros termination here was a favorable 
termination, for the abandonment of charges for “insufficient 
evidence” unquestionably provides “an indication that the 
accused is actually innocent of the crimes charged.”  Hilfirty 
v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
Haefner v. Burkey, 626 A.2d 519, 521 (Pa. 1993) (holding as 
a matter of Pennsylvania law that nol pros “because of 
insufficient evidence” demonstrates that “the proceedings 
terminated in favor of the [accused]”). 
 
In Geness’s case, the DA’s Office anticipated it would 
be “unable to prove the case,” App. 174, and the state court 
agreed that “a reasonable possibility that the decedent just 
fell” would make it “impossible for the Commonwealth to 
prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt,” App. 177.  In 
addition, the proposed order submitted by the DA’s Office 
expressly acknowledged “substantive evidentiary issues in 
this matter that likely could and would impair the 
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Commonwealth’s ability to meet its burden of proof.”  App. 
205a.   
Under Kossler and Donohue, this nol pros disposition 
did reflect a favorable termination, and the District Court 
should not have dismissed the malicious prosecution claim 
for failure to prove that element.8  Nonetheless, we may 
affirm on any basis in the record and one such basis is 
apparent:  Geness failed to satisfy his burden to establish a 
genuine dispute of material fact concerning the absence of 
probable cause.  We turn next to that issue. 
  
  2. Probable Cause 
 
Where, as here, a probable cause finding was made by 
a neutral magistrate in connection with a warrant application, 
a plaintiff must establish “first, that the officer, with at least a 
reckless disregard for the truth, ‘made false statements or 
omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a 
warrant,’” and second, “that those assertions or omissions 
were ‘material, or necessary, to the finding of probable 
cause.’”  Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 468-69 
(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-
87 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Omissions are made with reckless 
disregard only if an officer withholds a fact “in his ken” that 
any “reasonable person would have known . . . [is] the kind of 
                                              
8 The fact that the charges were dismissed without 
prejudice is also not fatal to favorable termination.  See 
Haefner, 626 A.2d at 521 n.2 (holding that charges 
terminated favorably even though they could have been 
“reinstated”). 
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thing the judge would wish to know,” id. at 470 (quoting 
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
and the focus is thus “facts and circumstances within the 
officer’s knowledge” at the time of the arrest, irrespective of 
later developments, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 
(1979).    
 
Geness’s argument, in essence, is that Cox knew and 
failed to disclose in his Affidavit of Probable Cause (1) the 
exculpatory evidence in the EMS report and hospital 
admission records; and (2) Geness’s inability, because he was 
incompetent or highly suggestible, to give a valid confession.  
We have little doubt that this information, had it been known 
to Cox when he swore out his Affidavit of Probable Cause, 
would satisfy the threshold for “[r]eckless [o]missions,” 
Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 470-74, and had Geness’s counsel 
“go[ne] beyond the pleadings” and “come forward with 
‘specific facts showing that there [was] a genuine [dispute 
concerning such knowledge] for trial,’” Santini v. Fuentes, 
795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)), 
it would have been error to grant summary judgment.  
  
But there’s the rub:  Because Geness elected not to 
depose Cox,9 the only evidence in the record concerning 
                                              
9 While Geness’s counsel asserts he did not “choose” 
to forego Cox’s deposition, Appellant’s Br. 44 n.15, it is 
beyond dispute that he sought to depose Cox after the 
deadline for fact discovery and after Cox’s motion for 
summary judgment had already been filed.  We cannot say it 
was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to grant a 
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Cox’s knowledge of the exculpatory evidence or Geness’s 
competence at that time is Cox’s own affidavit in support of 
summary judgment.  In it, Cox swears that he “ha[s] no 
recollection of ever having seen [the EMS or hospital records] 
prior to the filing of this lawsuit,” App. 164; that to obtain 
them, he would have required a search warrant, which he also 
“ha[s] no recollection of ever having obtained,” id., and that 
he observed, before taking Geness’s confession, that Geness 
“indicated his understanding of [Cox’s] purpose for being 
there,” that he signed the Miranda waiver, and that he “was 
able to respond” to questions and answer “appropriately,” id. 
at 162.   
 
What Geness identifies as contradictory circumstantial 
“evidence” in the record is, on inspection, nothing more than 
“speculation or conjecture [that] does not create a material 
factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment.”  
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014).  Even 
viewing in the light most favorable to Geness, see Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a); Burton, 707 F.3d at 425, the fact that the 
Unionville Hospital records reflect a print-out date of 
November 16, 2006, the same date as Cox’s one-day 
investigation, it is equally or more plausible—particularly in 
view of Cox’s assertion that he could not access such records 
without a search warrant—that the records were printed not 
                                                                                                     
protective order, precluding Cox’s deposition, in this 
circumstance.  See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 
193, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (“As we have often said, matters of 
docket control and discovery are committed to broad 
discretion of the district court.”).  
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for Cox but for hospital risk management personnel, treating 
physicians, or Fiffik’s family members.  Nor, outside of 
hypothetical possibilities, does the record support a linkage 
between the fact that Cox had a general practice of turning his 
files over to the DA’s Office and the fact that the DA’s 
Office—which could have received the hospital records from 
any number of sources—eventually had those records in its 
possession to produce to Tummons.   
 
As Geness elected not to depose any of the witnesses 
who might have substantiated his hypotheses,10 however, he 
is left with disparate facts and possible inferences from which 
to argue Cox’s contemporaneous knowledge of the reports’ 
                                              
10 For example, Geness did not depose any of the 
Unionville Hospital personnel with whom Cox spoke on the 
day of the investigation to ascertain whether they 
communicated to him the substance of the admission report; 
any hospital records custodian who might have maintained a 
record of how the admission report came to be printed out on 
that day and to whom it was provided; Fiffik’s daughter 
concerning her conversation with Cox that day and any 
documents she may have provided to him at that time; 
Fiffik’s wife concerning any conversations she may have had 
with Cox before he filed his Affidavit of Probable Cause; or 
the initial investigating officer concerning what, if anything, 
he conveyed to Cox about his conversations with Fiffik or 
McVey on the day of the incident.  See, e.g., Montgomery v. 
De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1998) (reversing a 
grant of summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim 
because, through discovery, the plaintiff “raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to probable cause”). 
25 
exculpatory contents.  At best, however, that amounts to “a 
mere ‘scintilla of evidence’ in [Geness’s] favor,” Ramara, 
Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2016), 
and not what is needed to survive summary judgment:  
“evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for 
[Geness],” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
252 (1986). 
 
Geness fares no better with his “facts” purportedly 
showing that Cox knew at the time that Geness’s Miranda 
waiver and confession were not “reasonably trustworthy.”  
Zimmerman, 873 F.3d at 418.  Geness’s current counsel 
points to Tummons’s affidavit, recounting that Geness told 
her the police put words in his mouth, and notes that he 
“expects [Geness] to be able to testify that he was told by 
Defendant Cox that he committed this crime, thereby 
obviating . . . hearsay considerations.”  Appellant’s Br. 45 n. 
16 (emphasis added).  Starkly absent from the existing record, 
however, is any testimony or affidavit from Geness, or any 
other contemporaneous evidence suggesting that his 
confession was indeed coerced.  Cf. Sutkiewicz v. Monroe 
Cty. Sheriff, 110 F.3d 352, 358-60 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(concluding that recordings of interrogation undermined 
probable cause because they showed the officer “strongly 
suggested to [the accused mentally ill man] that he should 
confess”).   
 
And while Geness’s counsel insinuates that his 
impairments were so severe and pronounced that it would 
have been apparent to any reasonable officer that his 
confession was involuntary, counsel did not adduce any 
testimony or evidence to that effect in discovery.  For 
example, Geness’s counsel did not seek to depose or submit 
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affidavits from personnel at Highlands Hospital where Cox 
interviewed Geness, the physicians who conducted Geness’s 
psychiatric examinations, or any experts as to how Geness 
presented at the time and whether his incompetence would 
have been obvious.11  Cf. Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750, 
756 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff’s “pronounced 
cognitive and developmental disabilities,” coupled with 
allegations that the “detectives and investigator noticed [the 
plaintiff’s] unusual behavior,” supported plausible inference 
that “the defendants either knew the confession was untrue or 
acted in reckless disregard of the truth”).  In short, aside from 
Geness’s mental condition—which, “by itself and apart from 
its relation to official coercion,” does not render his 
confession involuntary, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
164 (1986)—Geness has not identified any admissible 
evidence in Cox’s “ken” contradicting the affidavit.  
Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 469-70. 
 
According to that affidavit, the “facts and 
circumstances within . . . [Cox’s] knowledge” at the time of 
the arrest, DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37, were (1) that Fiffik’s 
daughter believed her father had been pushed off the wall by 
Geness; (2) that McVey had heard Geness scream at Fiffik 
moments before Fiffik was discovered on the ground, had 
seen Geness rush to his room and assume a fetal position, and 
                                              
11 To the contrary, counsel argues that even Tummons 
did not appreciate “the extent of [Geness’s] mental 
impairment” until she received the psychiatric reports, 
Appellant’s Br. 54-55—two years after she met with Geness 
and took on his representation.  
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had been told by Fiffik later that day Fiffik had been pushed; 
and (3) that Geness—after agreeing to speak, waiving his 
Miranda rights, and answering basic questions accurately and 
appropriately—provided a confession consistent with 
McVey’s account.  Probable cause requires only sufficient 
probability, not certainty that a crime has been committed, see 
Zimmerman, 873 F.3d at 418-19.  As the foregoing discussion 
makes clear, the facts then known to Cox were sufficient for a 
“reasonable person” to reach that conclusion.  Dempsey, 834 
F.3d at 469-70.12 
                                              
12 Under our case law to date, a malicious prosecution 
claim fails so long as “the proceeding was initiated . . . with[] 
probable cause.”  Zimmerman, 873 F.3d at 418 (emphasis 
added).  The Supreme Court has recently stated, though, that, 
“those objecting to a pretrial deprivation of liberty may 
invoke the Fourth Amendment when . . . that deprivation 
occurs [even] after legal process commences,” Manuel, 137 
S. Ct. at 918, and some of our Sister Circuits have implicitly 
authorized a malicious prosecution claim based upon a theory 
of “continuing prosecution,” i.e., that the prosecution 
continued and charges were not dismissed after the revelation 
of sufficient exculpatory information to undermine a probable 
cause finding, see Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 290 n.5 (9th 
Cir. 1994), as amended (Apr. 15, 1994) (“Probable cause to 
continue a prosecution may disappear with the discovery of 
new exculpatory evidence after the preliminary hearing . . . 
[and] state actors who . . . suppress [this evidence] may be 
liable for malicious prosecution . . . .”); accord Jones v. City 
of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that a 
malicious prosecution claim could be stated “[i]f police 
officers have been instrumental in the plaintiff’s continued 
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 C.  The ADA and Due Process Claim 
 
Finally, we turn to Geness’s claims that his prolonged 
detention, without a hearing, pending duplicative and futile 
psychiatric examinations violated due process and constituted 
discrimination “by reason of [mental] disability” under the 
ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 12132.  These claims go to the heart of the 
systemic problems that plagued this case, but Geness did not 
have the opportunity to pursue them because he initially 
named the wrong defendants and the District Court denied 
him leave to add the right one, the Commonwealth.  Its 
reasoning was that, although requests to amend generally 
should be “freely given” in the absence of (1) undue delay, 
bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) futility, or (3) prejudice to 
the other party, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); 
Lake, 232 F.3d at 373; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, two of 
those grounds applied here: futility, because the claims would 
be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and delay, 
because Geness provided no explanation, other than “recently 
discovered case law” in the form of the thirteen-year-old 
Supreme Court case Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), 
for waiting four-months before seeking to add the 
Commonwealth.  Geness, 2017 WL 1058826, at *2-3.   
 
For the reasons we explain below, neither of these 
grounds justified a departure from the general rule in favor of 
permissive amendment. 
                                                                                                     
confinement or prosecution”).  We have no occasion to 
consider that theory today, as it was not raised by Geness and 
he states his claim only against Cox, not any other actors 
responsible for Geness’s continued confinement. 
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1. Geness’s ADA and Due Process 
Claims Are Not Futile.  
  
   a. Geness’s Claims Are Not 
Barred by Rooker-Feldman. 
 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “bars federal district 
courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court 
actions.”  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 342 F.3d 242, 256 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rooker v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)).  This “narrow 
doctrine . . . applies only in ‘limited circumstances,’” Lance v. 
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464-66 (2006), and is restricted to 
cases where “four requirements are met: (1) the federal 
plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of 
injuries caused by the state-court judgment, (3) that judgment 
issued before the federal suit was filed, and (4) the plaintiff 
invites the district court to review and reject the state-court 
judgment.”  In re Phila. Entm’t & Dev. Partners, 879 F.3d 
492, 500 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Great W. Mining & Mineral 
Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 
2010)).   
 
Contrary to the District Court’s ruling that Geness 
stated “a direct challenge to a state court’s orders and 
judgments,” App. 30, neither the first nor the fourth 
requirements were met.  Geness is not a “state-court loser[],” 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 
280, 284, 293 (2005), in the sense that his ADA and due 
process claims were presented to or ruled upon by the state 
court; they were not.  Nor is Geness a “federal plaintiff who 
was injured by a state-court judgment . . . invariably seeking 
review and rejection of that judgment.”  Great Western, 615 
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F.3d at 168.  Instead, a subsequent federal claim constitutes 
“[p]rohibited appellate review” only when it “consists of a 
review . . . to determine whether [the lower tribunal] reached 
its result in accordance with law,” id. at 169, or when the 
federal plaintiff seeks “to have the state-court decisions 
undone or declared null and void,” id. at 173.   
 
Neither pertains here.  Geness asserts that the orders 
requiring him to be held for future, duplicative examinations, 
despite the hopelessness of his gaining competence, and the 
prolonged detention that resulted, amounted to disability 
discrimination.  His federal suit thus presents an 
“‘independent claim,’ even if that claim denies a legal 
conclusion reached by the state court,” id. at 169 (quoting 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293), and seeks a remedy for 
the “legal injury caused by the adverse party”—the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—not any “legal injury 
caused by a state court judgment because of a legal error 
committed by the state court,” id.  
 
As a result, this case falls comfortably outside the 
boundaries we have set for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  In 
Great Western, where the plaintiff asserted the defense 
attorney had conspired with the Common Pleas judges who 
ruled on his arbitration-related claim, we explained that 
Rooker-Feldman does not present a jurisdictional bar to 
federal review when the plaintiff asserts not “merely” that the 
“state-court decisions were incorrect,” id. at 172, but that 
“people involved in the decision violated some independent 
right,” id.  Similarly, in Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-
Barre, a case concerning repeated state court determinations 
that the plaintiff’s pizza shop was a nuisance, we held 
Rooker-Feldman inapplicable where the shop owner alleged 
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his shop was targeted for enforcement “with the intent to 
drive certain ethnic groups out of the city,” because such a 
claim arose independently of the state court finding that the 
shop was, in fact, a nuisance.  321 F.3d 411, 422-26 (3d Cir. 
2003); see also id. at 425 (“It is well established . . . that 
selective prosecution may constitute illegal discrimination 
even if the prosecution is otherwise warranted.” (citing Wayte 
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985))).  
 
Like those plaintiffs, Geness alleges “federal [due 
process] and statutory discrimination claims,” id. at 423, 
namely, that the Office of the Fayette County District 
Attorney and the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County 
acted in concert to deprive him of “an independent 
constitutional” and statutory right—the right to a forum free 
of disability discrimination—that arises irrespective of 
whether he was, in fact, competent to stand trial, Great 
Western, 615 F.3d at 161.  Rooker-Feldman is therefore 
inapplicable, and the District Court erred in denying leave to 
amend on that ground of futility. 
 
   b.  Geness’s Claim Is Not 
Otherwise Futile. 
 
As we may affirm on any ground supported by the 
record, we have considered whether Geness’s proposed claim 
would be futile for any other reason and conclude it would 
not.  On the contrary, “taking all pleaded allegations as true 
and viewing them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff” as 
we must when evaluating futility, Great Western, 615 F.3d at 
175 (citing Winer Family Tr. v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 330-31 
(3d Cir. 2007)), Geness has stated cognizable ADA and due 
process claims.  
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To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Geness 
must establish:  “(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a 
disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity; (4) by reason of his disability.”  Haberle v. Troxell, 
885 F.3d 170, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2018) (brackets omitted); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 12132.   
 
As for the first two, he sufficiently pleaded that he is a 
qualified individual with a disability.  See App. 78; see also 
Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1998) 
(holding that a state prisoner is a “qualified individual” under 
the ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining “disability” to 
include “a . . . mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities”).   
 
He also sufficiently pleaded the last two, i.e., that he 
was “denied . . . benefits [and] services” and “subjected to 
discrimination . . . by reason of his disability.”  Haberle, 885 
F.3d at 178.  Regulations promulgated under the ADA require 
that the Commonwealth “shall ensure that inmates or 
detainees with disabilities are housed in the most integrated 
setting appropriate to the needs of the individuals,” 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.152(b)(2) (emphasis added), and “[s]hall not place 
inmates or detainees with disabilities in inappropriate security 
classifications because no accessible cells or beds are 
available,” id. § 35.152(b)(2)(i).  Pennsylvania’s Mental 
Health Procedures Act also requires that “[w]henever a 
person who is detained on criminal charges or is incarcerated 
is made subject to inpatient examination or treatment, he shall 
be transferred, for this purpose, to a mental health facility,” 
50 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7401(b) (emphasis added), and 
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although the Act provides that a person accused of murder 
“may be subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment,” it 
limits that to “a period not to exceed one year,” id.                   
§ 7304(g)(2).  Involuntary competency restoration treatment 
can only take place if it is “reasonably certain that the 
involuntary treatment will provide the defendant with the 
capacity to stand trial.”  Id. § 7402(b).  These procedural 
protections are designed to avoid undue delays and safeguard 
the fair and efficient functioning of the criminal justice 
system, and the denial of those protections, leading to the 
“unjustified institutional[ization] . . . of persons with 
disabilities,” is “a form of discrimination.”  Olmstead v. L.C. 
ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).   
    
Here, despite the Commonwealth’s statutory 
commands and the protections they were intended to provide, 
Geness was incarcerated for seven months before he was 
ordered to seek treatment, was forced to wait three months 
more for that order to be carried out, and—notwithstanding 
that the competency evaluation declared him “unable to 
recognize the role of personnel in the court system,” “unable 
to recognize the different methods of trial,” “unable to 
recognize various outcomes from his pending charges,” with 
a “poor” prognosis for improvement, App. 197-98—Geness 
was returned to prison for three years.  He was then ordered 
to undergo another evaluation, forced to wait another year to 
receive it, and involuntarily committed for several more 
years—not only without “reasonabl[e] certain[ty]” he would 
attain capacity, 50 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7402(b), but in the 
face of a second evaluation that had declared him “not likely 
to respond to any additional treatment interventions.”  App. 
203.   
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As alleged, these multiple, protracted, and inexcusable 
delays in the handling of Geness’s examinations, transfers, 
and motions—resulting in nearly a decade of imprisonment 
and civil commitment before a hearing was finally held on his 
habeas petition—are more than sufficient to state a claim 
under the ADA.13  See Haberle, 885 F.3d at 179 (finding 
discrimination on the basis of disability where the “disability 
‘played a role in the . . . decisionmaking process and . . . had a 
determinative effect on the outcome of that process’”); CG v. 
Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2013) (“To 
satisfy . . . causation [under the ADA], Plaintiffs must prove 
                                              
 13 To the extent Geness seeks monetary damages on 
his ADA claim, see App. 79, he must “adequately ple[a]d that 
[the Commonwealth] acted with deliberate indifference to the 
risk of an ADA violation.”  Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181.  
“[C]laims for compensatory damages under . . . the ADA also 
require a finding of intentional discrimination,” which 
requires proof, at minimum, of deliberate indifference, S.H. 
ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 
261-63 (3d Cir. 2013), which may be pleaded by showing that 
the defendant failed to “adequately respond to a pattern of 
past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiff[’s],” Beers-
Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 136 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Geness’s complaint does not do this, thus, like we did 
recently in Haberle, we will grant him “the narrow 
opportunity to amend h[is] complaint with respect to [his] 
ADA claim, particularly [the] allegations of a history of civil 
rights violations by [the Commonwealth], because deliberate 
indifference was not discussed in the District Court as to that 
claim,” 885 F.3d at 182 n.12.  
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that they were treated differently based on . . . their 
disability.”); see also Cooper v. Kliebert, No. 15-751-SDD-
RLB, 2016 WL 3892445, at *6 (M.D. La. July 18, 2016) 
(denying motion to dismiss ADA claims brought by mentally 
handicapped pretrial detainees stemming from denial of 
“prompt transfer of [plaintiffs] . . . from [local] jails” to 
appropriate mental health facilities).  
 
These same circumstances are also sufficient to sustain 
Geness’s claim that he was “depr[ived] . . . of normal benefits 
of criminal procedure and due process of law,” App. 78, both 
as to his protracted incarceration without prompt transfer to a 
mental health facility, and his protracted institutionalization 
without a realistic prospect of trial.  As for his incarceration, 
Pennsylvania requires that criminal defendants suspected of 
mental illness receive mental health services, 50 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 7401(b), and it is well-established that the 
extended imprisonment of pretrial detainees when they have 
been ordered to receive such services violates the 
Constitution.14  See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 
                                              
14 The Commonwealth acknowledged as much in a 
recently-settled class action brought on behalf of mentally ill 
inmates who claimed that the practice of continuing detention 
“for more than thirty . . . days after the determination that the 
[plaintiff] is unlikely to become competent,” violates the 
Constitution and the ADA.  See Complaint at ¶ 193, J.H. v. 
Dallas, No. 1:15-cv-02057-SHR (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2015).  In 
the settlement agreement, the Commonwealth stipulated that, 
generally, excessive wait times violate the Constitution and, 
specifically, its “average wait times of at least sixty . . . days . 
. . fail to comply with Fourteenth Amendment due process 
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(1992) (“[It is] unconstitutional for a State to continue to 
confine a harmless, mentally ill person.”); see also Trueblood 
v. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 822 F.3d 1037, 
1039 (9th Cir. 2016) (“It is well recognized that detention in a 
jail is no substitute for mentally ill detainees who need 
therapeutic evaluation and treatment.”); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. 
Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Holding 
incapacitated criminal defendants in jail for weeks or months 
violates their due process rights . . . .”).15 
                                                                                                     
guarantees.”  Settlement Agreement at 3, ECF No. 35, J.H. v. 
Dallas, No. 1:15-cv-02057-SHR (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2016).  
Those violations, moreover, appear to be widespread.  
According to the County Commissioners Association of 
Pennsylvania, “[c]ounties have reached a level of frustration 
over the inability to address mental illness in jails due to 
resource limits at the state level,” Cty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., 
Comprehensive Behavioral Health Task Force: Report of 
Findings and Recommendations at 5, (Aug. 7, 2016), 
https://tinyurl.com/y88z8mzp, and “[t]he shortage of 
psychiatric, or forensic, beds in state hospitals for county 
inmates who have mental illness and developmental 
disabilities has become a crisis that fails to effectively or 
compassionately address human need,” Cty. Comm’rs Ass’n 
of Pa., Increasing Forensic Bed Access for County Inmates 
with Mental Illness (2018), https://tinyurl.com/y7d7qebl. 
 
15 See also Hunter v. Beshear, No. 2:16-cv-798-MHT, 
2018 WL 564856 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2018); Disability Law 
Ctr. v. Utah, 180 F. Supp. 3d 998 (D. Utah 2016); Advocacy 
Ctr. for the Elderly & Disabled v. La. Dep’t of Health & 
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As for his institutionalization, the Supreme Court 
announced more than forty years ago in Jackson v. Indiana, 
406 U.S. 715 (1972), that “indefinite commitment of a 
criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency to 
stand trial does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process,” id. at 731, and the Constitution 
forbids detention of the accused “committed solely on 
account of . . . incapacity” any longer than “the reasonable 
period of time necessary to determine whether there is a 
substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the 
foreseeable future,” id. at 738.  Once it has been determined 
that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will 
attain the capacity to stand trial, a state “must” either 
“institute . . . customary civil commitment proceeding[s]” or 
“release the defendant.”  Id.; see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77 
(“Even if the initial commitment was permissible, ‘it [can]not 
constitutionally continue after that basis no longer exist[s].’”); 
United States v. Foy, 803 F.3d 128, 142 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(Krause, J., concurring) (observing that “the circumstances of 
Foy’s continued civil commitment in federal custody raise 
significant statutory and due process concerns”).  Even if 
there is a likelihood of regaining capacity, “continued 
commitment must be justified by progress towards that goal,” 
and while the Court has declined to impose “arbitrary time 
limits,” the three-year commitment period in Jackson 
“sufficiently establishe[d]” that the detainee would never be 
“able to participate fully in a trial.”  406 U.S. at 738-39.   
                                                                                                     
Hosps., 731 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. La. 2010); Terry ex rel. 
Terry v. Hill, 232 F. Supp. 2d 934 (E.D. Ark. 2002). 
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In view of this authority, the constitutional claims 
Geness seeks to bring against the Commonwealth as to both 
the length of his pretrial imprisonment and the length of his 
civil commitment would not be futile.  After his first 
psychological evaluation indicated that he “remain[s] 
incompetent to stand trial,” App. 198, Geness was 
incarcerated for an additional three years before civil 
commitment proceedings and a second examination were 
even requested.  And once institutionalized, Geness was left 
to languish for another four years before he was granted a 
hearing on his habeas petition and the charges against him 
were dismissed.  There is no question this exceeded the 
“reasonable period of time necessary” under Jackson to 
ascertain whether there was a substantial probability Geness 
would attain competency in the foreseeable future. 
 
  2. Geness Did Not Unduly Delay in 
Seeking Amendment.   
 
The ground of “undue delay” also did not justify the 
District Court’s denial of leave to amend.  As we have 
cautioned, “delay alone is an insufficient ground to deny 
leave to amend,” and only delays that are either “undue” or 
“prejudicial” warrant denial of leave to amend.  Cureton v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 
2001).   
 
Geness’s delay in seeking to substitute the 
Commonwealth as a party was neither.  His delay was not 
“undue” because he raised it less than a year from the filing 
of his complaint, see Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 
(3d Cir.1993) (finding a three year lapse between filing of 
complaint and proposed amendment an “unreasonable” 
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delay), and doing so at the summary judgment stage “is not 
unusual,” Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 869 (3d Cir. 
1984) (citing 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1488, at 436 (1971)); see also Dole v. Arco 
Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 488 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Amendment 
may be permitted at any point during the course of 
litigation.”).  It also would not have prejudiced Cox because, 
as the District Court noted, Geness’s “proposed factual 
allegations in his amended complaint . . . against the 
Commonwealth . . . are identical to those in his . . . complaint 
against Fayette County,” Geness, 2017 WL 1058826, at *3.  
Thus, amendment would not have required of the detective 
any “additional discovery, cost, and preparation to defend 
against new facts or new theories.”  Cureton, 252 F.3d at 
273.16   
 
In sum, neither futility nor delay justified the denial of 
leave for Geness to amend his complaint to reinstate his ADA 
and due process claims against the Commonwealth.   
 
                                              
16 The prejudice inquiry considers the effect of 
amendment on the existing defendants in the case, not the 
new defendant proposed to be added by way of amendment.  
Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1414 (“[P]rejudice to the non-moving party 
is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment.”) (emphasis 
added); see also Formosa Plastics Corp., U.S.A. v. ACE Am. 
Ins. Co., 259 F.R.D. 95, 99 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding no 
prejudice when “Plaintiff is only seeking to add one 
additional party and, as such, the current Defendants will 
likely not incur significant additional resources . . . .).   
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IV.  Conclusion 
 
Absurd as it may seem that Geness was detained for 
nine years for a crime that may not have occurred and now 
cannot pursue relief under § 1983, multipoint failures in the 
criminal justice system have brought us to this juncture.  
Those failures point up the essential role of each player in that 
system—whether law enforcement officer, prison official, 
mental health professional, defense counsel, prosecutor, or 
judge—and the devastating consequences that can follow 
when one or more of them fails to diligently safeguard the 
civil rights with which they are entrusted.  With the 
complexities at the intersection of the criminal justice and 
mental health systems, those risks are only compounded and 
require vigilance at a systemic level.  As for the case before 
us, we will reverse the District Court’s denial of leave to 
amend, remanding for Geness to reinstate his claim against 
the Commonwealth, and we will affirm the District Court in 
all other respects.  
